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Abstract
We study an exchange economy with indivisible objects that may not be
substitutes for each other, and we introduce the p-substitutability condition, a
relaxation of the gross substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982), in
which a parameter vector p is adopted to permit complicated types of comple-
mentarity. We prove that for any economy E, there exists a corresponding vector
pE such that the pE-substitutability condition is su¢ cient to guarantee the exis-
tence of a competitive equilibrium, and that the largest competitive price of each
object is equal to its contribution to the social welfare. Our approach relies on a
classication result that partitions economies into disjoint similarity classes such
that whenever a similarity class contains an economy with an equilibrium, each
economy in this class also has an equilibrium.
Keywords: Indivisibility, equilibrium, gross substitutability, p-substitutability.
1 Introduction
An essential issue for markets with heterogeneous indivisible objects and preferences
that are quasi-linear in money is under which conditions an e¢ cient allocation of objects
can be supported by a system of competitive prices as an equilibrium outcome.1 A
su¢ cient condition for the existence of a competitive equilibrium is the gross substitutes
condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982), which requires that objects are substitutes in
the sense that the demand of each agent for an object does not decrease when prices of
some other objects increase. However, in many market situations, heterogeneous objects
Previous versions of the paper were circulated under the title Free disposal, monotonicity, and
equilibrium.
yDepartment of Statistics and Actuarial Science, Aletheia University, New Taipei City 251, Taiwan.
E-mail address: yyyang@mail.au.edu.tw
1See Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997), Ma (1998), Gul and Stacchetti (1999), Sun and Yang (2006),
among others.
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may not be perfect substitutes for all agents. For example, a scarf and a sweater may be
substitutes for one agent, but are complements for another. To analyze such markets
with di¤erent types of preferences, we introduce the notion of p-substitutability, in
which a parameter vector p is employed to determine the range of covered preferences
and to capture partial substitutability among objects.
The p-substitutability condition extends the gross substitutes condition in three re-
spects. First, any agents preferences satisfy the p-substitutability condition for some
proper vectors p. Hence, our framework could incorporate arbitrary patterns of comple-
mentarity. Second, p-substitutability is strictly weaker than p0-substitutability if p  p0.
This suggests that for an agent i, the degree of partial substitutability among objects
could be analyzed by the lower frontier of the set of vectors p such that is preferences
are p-substitutable. Finally, p-substitutability is closely linked to gross substitutability:
agent is preferences are p-substitutable for all parameter vectors p if and only if i views
objects as perfect substitutes for each other.
Based on these observations, we prove that for an arbitrary exchange economy E,
there exists a corresponding vector pE such that when each agents preferences are
pE-substitutable, the following results hold:
(i) There exists a competitive equilibrium.
(ii) The largest competitive price of each object coincides with its contribution to the
social welfare.
(iii) The societys aggregate demand satises the gross substitutes condition.
A result by Gul and Stacchetti (1999, Theorem 2) shows that no weakening of the
gross substitutes condition is su¢ cient for an equilibrium to exist. As in the result (i),
we make a breakthrough and prove that the p-substitutability condition can guarantee
the existence of an equilibrium for economy E whenever p  pE. Another issue that
concerns us is the contribution of an object to the social welfare, which is well known
as an upper bound for its competitive prices. The result (ii) shows that this bound
itself is a competitive price under pE-substitutability, extending a former result by Gul
and Stacchetti (1999, Theorem 5). In the nal result, we consider an representative
agent whose demand function coincides with the societys aggregate demand, and show
that the gross substitutability of individual agentspreferences is su¢ cient, but not
necessary for the gross substitutability of the representative agents preferences. Hence,
objects could be substitutes for the whole society even when complementarity exists
among the objects for individual agents.
Our results contribute to the literature on gross substitutability. Gul and Stacchetti
(1999) prove that both their single improvement condition and no complementarities
condition are equivalent to the gross substitutes condition. Fujishige and Yang (2003)
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draw the equivalence between M \-concavity and gross substitutability in the frame-
work of discrete convex analysis. Hateld and Milgrom (2005) and Hateld and Ko-
jima (2010) introduce various extensions of gross substitutability to the frameworks of
matching with contracts, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model and some
fundamental results on competitive equilibria in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce
the p-substitutability condition and our main equilibrium results. In Section 4, we
prove our main results with a structural result that partitions economies into similarity
classes. Section 5 relates our analysis to an existence result by Sun and Yang (2006)
and concludes.
2 The model
We consider an exchange economy with a nite set N = f1; : : : ; ng of agents and a nite
set 
 = fa1; : : : ; amg of heterogeneous indivisible objects, and a perfectly divisible good
called money. Each agent i 2 N has a valuation function vi : 2
 ! R with vi (;) = 0.
The valuation vi gives rise to a quasi-linear utility function ui such that the utility of
agent i holding the set of objects A  
 and c units of money is
ui (A; c)  vi (A) + c:
For each coalition of agents C  N , the corresponding aggregate valuation function,
viC : 2

 ! R, is dened by
viC (A)  max
(X
i2C
vi (Ai) :
[
i2C
Ai = A and Ai \ Aj = ; for i 6= j
)
for A  
: (1)
An allocation is a partition of objects among all agents in N , i.e., a set X =
(X1; : : : ; Xn) of mutually exclusive bundles that exhaust 
, where Xi represents agent
i s consumption bundle under the allocation X. The possibility that Xi = ; for some
i is allowed. An allocation X = (X1; : : : ; Xn) is called e¢ cient if it maximizes the sum
of agentsvalues, i.e.,
Pn
i=1 vi (Xi) = viN (
).
A price vector p = (pa)a2
 2 Rj
j assigns a price to each object a 2 
. For any
set of objects A  
; let p (A) be a shorthand for Pa2A pa. A valuation function vi
is additively separable if there exists a price vector p such that vi (A) = p (A) for all
A  
.
Given two vectors p
0
; p
00 2 Rj
j, we write p = p0_p00 if p is the vector in Rj
j satisfying
pa = max fp0a; p00ag for all a 2 
. Given a sequence of vectors p1; p2; : : : ; pr in Rj
j, we
write p = _rk=1pk if p is the vector in Rj
j satisfying pa = max fp1a; p2a; : : : ; prag for all
a 2 
. For any valuation function vi, let pvi 2 Rj
j denote the minimal marginal value
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vector of vi given by
pvia  min fvi (A [ fag)  vi (A) : A  
n fagg for a 2 
: (2)
A competitive equilibrium is a pair hX; pi, where X =(X1; : : : ; Xn) is an allocation
for E and p 2 Rj
j is a price vector such that for each agent i 2 N , the bundle Xi
maximizes is utility at price level p, i.e.,
Xi 2 Dvi (p)  fA  
 : vi (A)  p (A)  vi (B)  p (B) for all B  
g :
In this case, X is called an equilibrium allocation and p is called an equilibrium price
vector.
We assume that each agent i 2 N is initially endowed with a bundle of objects

i and a su¢ cient amount of money ci such that 
 = [i2N
i and ci  vi (A) for all
A  
. Under these assumptions, the initial endowments of objects and money will be
irrelevant to the competitive equilibria. Hence, we leave them unspecied and simply
represent this economy by E =
 

; (vi)i2N

.
We close this section with some fundamental observations on competitive equilibria.
The (a) and (b) parts of Lemma 1, originally given by Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997)
and Gul and Stacchetti (1999), show that the standard theorems of welfare economics
hold for an economy with indivisible objects; and the result of (c) shows that the
contribution of an object a 2 
 to the social welfare, or its social value, is an upper
bound for the equilibrium prices of a. Finally, Lemma 2 shows that the formation of a
coalition will not eliminate existing competitive equilibria.
Lemma 1 Let E =
 

; (vi)i2N

be an economy and hX; pi a competitive equilibrium
for E.
(a) The equilibrium allocation X is e¢ cient.
(b) For any e¢ cient allocation Y for E, hY; pi is also a competitive equilibrium.
(c) For each object a 2 
, pa  viN (
)  viN (
n fag).
Proof. Let Y =(Y1; : : : ; Yn) be an allocation for E.
(a) Since Xi 2 Dvi (p) for each i 2 N , we have
nX
i=1
vi (Xi) =
nX
i=1
[vi (Xi)  p (Xi)] + p (
)

nX
i=1
[vi (Yi)  p (Yi)] + p (
) =
nX
i=1
vi (Yi) :
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(b) In caseY is e¢ cient, the above inequality implies vi (Xi) p (Xi) = vi (Yi) p (Yi)
for each i 2 N; and hence hY; pi is also a competitive equilibrium for E.
(c ) LetN0 = N[f0g, X0 = ; and let E0 =
 

; (vi)i2N0

be the economy constructed
from E by adding an agent 0 whose valuation function v0 satises v0 (A) = p (A) for
A  
. Clearly, h(X0; X1; : : : ; Xn) ; pi is a competitive equilibrium for E0. By (a),
(X0; X1; : : : ; Xn) is an e¢ cient allocation for E0, and hence for each a 2 
, viN (
) =Pn
i=0 vi (Xi)  v0 (fag) + viN (
n fag) = pa + viN (
n fag).
Lemma 2 Let E =
 

; (vi)i2N

be an economy. Let C = f1; : : : ; rg  N and let
EC  (
; viC ; vr+1; : : : ; vn) denote the corresponding economy in which each agent in
C agrees to form a coalition and viC , the valuation function of representative agent
iC, is given by (1). If h(X1; : : : ; Xn) ; pi is a competitive equilibrium for E and let
XiC =
rS
j=1
Xj, then h(XiC ; Xr+1 : : : ; Xn) ; pi is a competitive equilibrium for EC.
Proof. Suppose that h(XiC ; Xr+1; : : : ; Xn) ; pi is not a competitive equilibrium for
EC . Then there exists YiC  
 such that viC (YiC )   p (YiC ) > viC (XiC )   p (XiC ).
By denition there is a sequence of mutually disjoint bundles fY1; : : : ; Yrg such that
rS
j=1
Yj = YiC and
Pr
j=1 vj (Yj) = viC (YiC ). Together with the fact that Xj 2 Dvj (p) for
j = 1; : : : ; r, we obtain
viC (YiC )  p (YiC ) > viC (XiC )  p (XiC ) 
rX
j=1
[vj (Xj)  p (Xj)]

rX
j=1
[vj (Yj)  p (Yj)] = viC (YiC )  p (YiC ) ;
which is impossible.
3 The p-substitutability condition
A su¢ cient condition for the existence of a competitive equilibrium is the gross substi-
tutes condition (Kelso and Crawford, 1982), the requirement that agents views hetero-
geneous objects as perfect substitutes for each other.
Denition 1 A valuation function vi satises the gross substitutes condition if for any
two price vectors p; q 2 Rj
j with p  q, and any bundle A 2 Dvi (p), there exists
B 2 Dvi (q) such that fa 2 A : qa = pag  B.
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Note that additive separability implies gross substitutability, and a result of Rei-
jnierse et al. (2002, Theorem 8) shows that if a valuation function vi satises the gross
substitutes condition, then vi has decreasing marginal returns, i.e., for each a 2 
,
a 2 A  B  
) vi (B)  vi (Bn fag)  vi (A)  vi (An fag) :
However, di¤erent agents may have di¤erent types of preferences in many market
situations. Consider the three-agent economy with one scarf fa1g and two sweaters
fa2; a3g given in Table I. The e¢ cient allocation X1 = f;g ; X2 = fag ; X3 = fb; cg
augmented with the price vector (8; 8; 8) is a competitive equilibrium, but only agent
1s valuation function satises the gross substitutes condition. The other two agents
view a scarf and a sweater as complements in the sense that both v2 and v3 satisfy the
gross substitutes and complements condition by Sun and Yang (2006).2
Table I
Agentsvaluations
; fa1g fa2g fa3g fa1; a2g fa1; a3g fa2; a3g fa1; a2; a3g
v1 0 7 7 7 13 13 12 19
v2 0 16 3 3 22 22 5 24
v3 0 5 11 11 17 17 20 23
To analyze such an economy with heterogeneous preferences, we introduce the notion
of p-substitutability, a relaxation of the gross substitutes condition, in which a parameter
vector p 2 Rj
j is employed for measuring the degree of substitutability of preferences.
Denition 2 A valuation function vi satises the p-substitutability condition for some
vector p 2 Rj
j if the function vi [p] given by
vi [p] (A)  max fvi (B) + p (AnB) : B  Ag for A  
: (3)
satises the gross substitutes condition.
Note that the function vi [p] coincides with the aggregate valuation function viC of
the coalition C = fi; jg, where j is a virtual agent who has an additively separable
valuation function vj satisfying vj (A) = p (A) for A  
. Hence, the p-substitutability
condition requires that objects are substitutes for the representative agent iC .
Lemma 3 Consider a sequence of valuation function v1; : : : ; vr and let C = f1; : : : ; rg.
If vi satises the gross substitutes condition for i = 1; : : : ; r, then the aggregate valuation
function viC also satises the gross substitutes condition.
2See the end of this section for the denition of the gross substitutes and complements condition.
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Proof. Suppose that viC fails the gross substitutes condition. Theorem 2 of Gul and
Stacchetti (1999) implies that there exists an economy E = (
; viC ; vr+1; : : : ; vn) such
that vi satises the gross substitutes condition for i = r+1; : : : ; n; but E has no compet-
itive equilibria. However, Theorem 2 of Kelso and Crawford (1982) implies that there
exists a competitive for the economy E 0 = (
; v1; : : : ; vr; vr+1 : : : ; vn), contradicting to
the result of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 improves on Theorem 6 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999), which shows that
under the same conditions, the aggregate valuation function viC has decreasing marginal
returns. Moreover, since additive separability is stronger than gross substitutability,
Lemma 3 implies that the p-substitutability condition is indeed a weakening of the
gross substitutes condition.
In the following result, we note that for an arbitrary valuation function vi : 2
 ! R,
the set of vectors
  (vi) 

p 2 Rj
j : vi satises the p-substitutability condition
	
provide a good deal of information about vi and the markets involves vi. Lemma 4 (a)
shows that objects are perfect substitutes for agent i if and only if   (vi) = Rj
j. Lemma
4 (b) and (c) give some insights into the structure of   (vi). Moreover, Theorem 1 shows
that for any economy E =
 

; (vi)i2N

, there exists a corresponding vector pE 2 Rj
j
such that a number of results hold whenever pE lies in   (vi) for all i 2 N . The proof
of Theorem 1 is given in the next section.
Lemma 4 Let vi : 2
 ! R be an arbitrary valuation function.
(a) vi satises the gross substitutes condition if and only if   (vi) = Rj
j.
(b)   (vi) is never empty.
(c) If p 2   (vi) and p  q 2 Rj
j, then q 2   (vi).
Proof. (a) The only ifpart of the proof follows from the fact that p-substitutability
is weaker than gross substitutability. The if part relies on the observation that vi
coincides with vi [pvi ], where the minimal marginal value vector pvi is dened by (2).
(b) Let p 2 Rj
j be a vector satisfying p (A)  vi (A) for all A  
. Then vi [p] (A) =
p (A) for all A  
. This implies that vi [p] is additively separable, and hence p 2   (vi).
(c) Assume that vi satises p-substitutability condition and p  q 2 Rj
j. By
denition vi [p] satises the gross substitutes condition. Then the result of (a) implies
that (vi [p]) [q] also satises the gross substitutes condition. Thus, it su¢ ces to show
that vi [q] coincides with (vi [p]) [q]. Let A be a set of objects. By denition, there exist
two subsets B and B0 of A such that vi [q] (A) = vi (B) + q (AnB) and (vi [p]) [q] (A) =
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vi [p] (B
0) + q (AnB0). Similarly, there exists C 0  B0 such that vi [p] (B0) = vi (C 0) +
p (B0nC 0). Then we have
vi [q] (A) = vi (B) + q (AnB)  vi [p] (B) + q (AnB)  (vi [p]) [q] (A)
= vi [p] (B
0) + q (AnB0) = vi (C 0) + p (B0nC 0) + q (AnB0)
 vi (C 0) + q (AnC 0)  vi [q] (A) ;
and hence vi [q] (A) = (vi [p]) [q] (A).
Theorem 1 Let E =
 

; (vi)i2N

be an economy and let pE  _ni=1pvi 2 Rj
j. If
each agent is valuation function vi satises the pE-substitutability condition, then the
following results hold:
(a) There exists a competitive equilibrium.
(b) The social value vector p = (pa) 2 Rj
j dened by pa = viN (
)  viN (
n fag) is an
equilibrium price vector.
(c) The social valuation function viN satises the gross substitutes condition, and hence
has decreasing marginal returns.
Theorem 1 (a) and (b) contribute to the analysis of competitive equilibrium in three
respects.
First, Theorem 2 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999) shows that the p-substitutability
condition, a strict weakening of the gross substitutes condition, cannot guarantee the
existence of an equilibrium for generic economies. However, we make a breakthrough
and prove that the p-substitutability condition is su¢ cient for the existence of a com-
petitive equilibrium for economy E whenever p  pE.
Second, we prove that the contribution of object a to the social welfare, pa =
vN (
)  vN (
n fag), is not only an upper bound for as competitive prices, but itself
is also a competitive price under pE-substitutability. This result generalizes Theorem
5 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999). Recall the economy given in Table I. It is not di¢ cult
to verify pE = (16; 6; 6) and that vi satises pE-substitutability condition for i = 1; 2; 3.
Hence, the e¢ cient allocation X1 = f;g ; X2 = fag ; X3 = fb; cg can be supported by
vector p = (16; 9; 9) as a competitive equilibrium.
Third, in case the market E =
 

; (vi)i2N

under consideration has no equilibria.
To generate a competitive equilibrium, the government can choose a vector ~p 2 Rj
j+
such that ~p _ pE 2 \i2N  (vi), and then promise to purchase any set of objects at
price level ~p. For example, the two-agent economy given in Table II has no equilibria,
and each agents valuation function violates the pE-substitutability condition. Since
pE = (1:5; 2; 0) and (1:5; 2; 1:5) 2   (v1) \   (v2), the government can create a new
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economy E 0 by adding itself as the third agent who has a valuation function v3 such
that v3 (A) = ~p (A) for ~p = (0; 0; 1:5) and A  
, and then yields an equilibrium for E 0.
Table II
Agentsvaluations
; fa1g fa2g fa3g fa1; a2g fa1; a3g fa2; a3g fa1; a2; a3g
v1 0 2 2 1 2 2 2 6
v2 0 5 5 1 7 5 5.5 7
The nal part of Theorem 1 extends Lemma 2 and shows that the gross substi-
tutability of individual agentsvaluation functions is su¢ cient but not necessary for
the gross substitutability of the social valuation function. This implies that objects
could be substitutes for each other from the viewpoint of the whole society even when
complementarity exists among the objects for individual agents. Consider the follow-
ing economy with one table (t) and two chairs (c1; c2) from Sun and Yang (2006). As
shown in Table III, chair c1 complements table t and is a perfect substitute for an-
other chair c2, and each agents valuation function satises the gross substitutes and
complements (GSC) condition for S1 = ftg and S2 = fc1; c2g, i.e., for any price vector
p 2 Rj
j; a 2 Sk;   0, and A 2 Dvi (p), there exists B 2 Dvi (p+ ea) such that
[A \ Sk] n fag  B  [A [ Sk], where ea 2 Rj
j denotes the characteristic vector whose
i-th coordinate is 1 if ai = a and 0 otherwise. Hence, there exists a competitive equi-
librium by Theorem 3.1 of Sun and Yang (2006), which shows that the GSC condition
is su¢ cient for the existence of an equilibrium.
Table III
Agentsvaluations
; ftg fc1g fc2g ft; c1g ft; c2g fc1; c2g ft; c1; c2g
v1 0 18 3 3 22 22 4 24
v2 0 1 11 11 13 13 20 23
v3 0 12 6 6 20 20 10 25
Theorem 1 gives an alternative way to analyze the economy. For this economy, pE =
(16; 6; 6) and vi satises pE-substitutability for i = 1; 2; 3. This implies that the e¢ cient
allocation X1 = ftg ; X2 = fc2; c3g ; X3 = ; can be supported by p = (18; 9; 9) and that
the social valuation function viN is gross substitutable.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on a classication result, Lemma 5, which partitions the
set of economies into disjoint similarity classes such that whenever a similarity class
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contains an economy with a competitive equilibrium, each economy in this class also
has a competitive equilibrium. Lemma 5 will be proved in the Appendix.
Denition 3 Two economies E 0 and E 00 are directly similar, denoted by E 0  E 00,
if there exist an economy E = (
; v1; : : : ; vn) and a vector q 2 Rj
j such that E 0 =
(
; v1; : : : ; vj [q] ; : : : ; vn) for some j 2 N and E 00 = (
; v0; v1; : : : ; vn) ; where v0 is the
the valuation function such that v0 (A) = q (A) for A  
. Moreover, we say that two
economies E 0 and E 00 are similar if there exists a sequence of economies, E0; E1; : : : ; Er,
such that E 0 = E0; E 00 = Er; and Ek 1  Ek for k = 1; : : : ; r.
Lemma 5 Let q 2 Rj
j and let E 0 = (
; v1 [q] ; v2; : : : ; vn) and E 00 = (
; v0; v1; : : : ; vn)
be two directly similar economies such that v0 is the valuation function satisfying v0 (A) =
q (A) for A  
. Then E 0 has a competitive equilibrium if and only if E 00 has a com-
petitive equilibrium.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1 with the aid of Lemmas 5. Assume that
vi

pE

satises the gross substitutes condition for all i 2 N .
(a) By Theorem 2 of Kelso and Crawford (1982) and Lemma 5, it su¢ ces to show
that E =
 

; (vi)i2N

is similar to the economy


;
 
vi

pE

i2N

. We rst note that
vi [p
vi ] = vi for each i 2 N , and hence E = (
; v1 [pv1 ] ; : : : ; vn [pvn ]).
For each i 2 N , let v0i be the valuation function dened by v0i (A) = pvi (A) for
A  
. It is not di¢ cult to see that E is similar to E1 = (
; v01; : : : ; v0n; v1; : : : ; vn).
Let E2 = (
; v02 [pv1 ] ; v03; : : : ; v0n; v1; : : : ; vn) and let
Ej 
 

; v0j
_j 1k=1pvk ; v0(j+1); : : : ; v0n; v1; : : : ; vn for j = 3; : : : ; n:
Since v0j
_j 1k=1pvk (A) =  _jk=1pvk (A) for A  
 and for j = 2; : : : ; n, it follows
that E and En =
 

; v0n
_n 1k=1pvk ; v1; : : : ; vn are similar. Let v0 = v0n _n 1k=1pvk.
Then v0 (A) = (_nk=1pvk) (A) = pE (A) for A  
 and hence we may write En =
(
; v0; v1; : : : ; vn). Finally, since v0 = v0

pE

and vi

pE

=
 
vi

pE
 
pE

for i =
1; : : : ; n, it follows that
En 
 

; v1

pE

; v2; : : : ; vn
   
; v1 pE ; v2 pE ; v3; : : : ; vn      
;  vi pEi2N :
(c) Suppose, to the contrary, that the social valuation function viN violates the
gross substitutes condition. By Theorem 2 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999), there exists an
economy E 0 = (
; viN ; vn+1; : : : ; vn0) such that vi satises the gross substitutes condition
for i = n + 1; : : : ; n0 but E 0 has no competitive equilibrium. We now consider the
economy E 00 = (
; v1; : : : ; vn; vn+1 : : : ; vn0). Note that pE
00
= _n0i=1pvi =
 _n0i=n+1pvi _
pE  pE. By Lemma 4 (a) and (c), we see that in the economy E 00, each agents
valuation function satises the pE
00
-substitutability condition. Then the combination of
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(a) and Lemma 2 implies that E 00 has a competitive equilibrium, and so does E 0. This
is impossible.
(b) Let Y = (Y1; : : : ; Yn) be an e¢ cient allocation for E. We are going to show that
hY; pi is a competitive equilibrium for E. Consider the economy E0 = (
; v0; v1; : : : ; vn)
constructed from E by adding an agent 0 with the valuation function v0 given by
v0 (A) = p (A) for A  
 and let N0 = f0; 1; : : : ; ng. Since pE0  pE, Lemma
4 (c) implies that in economy E0, each agents valuation function satises the pE0-
substitutability condition. By (a), there exists an equilibrium h(X0; X1; : : : ; Xn) ; pi for
E0. Without loss of generality, we may assume that X0 = fa1; : : : ; arg  
 and let
A0 = ;, Aj = fa1; : : : ; ajg for j = 1; : : : ; r. Note that (X0; X1; : : : ; Xn) is an e¢ cient
allocation for E0 and the result of (c) implies that the social valuation function viN has
decreasing marginal returns. It follows that
0 
rX
j=1
[viN (
)  viN (
n fajg)] 
rX
j=1
[viN (
nAj 1)  viN (
nAj)] (4)
= v0 (X0) + viN (
nX0)  viN (
)  v0 (X0) +
nX
j=1
vj (Xj)  viN (
)
= viN0 (
)  viN (
) :
Together with the fact that viN (
) =
Pn
i=1 vi (Yi) = v0 (;) +
Pn
i=1 vi (Yi)  viN0 (
),
we have viN (
) = v0 (;) +
Pn
i=1 vi (Yi) = viN0 (
). Let Y0 = ;. By Lemma 1 (b),h(Y0; Y1; : : : ; Yn) ; pi is also a competitive equilibrium for E0. This implies Yi 2 Dvi (p)
for i 2 N and
0  v0 (fag)  pa = pa   pa for all a 2 
:
Hence, h(Y1; : : : ; Yn) ; pi is a competitive equilibrium for E and pa  pa for all a 2 
.
Together with the result of Lemma 1 (c), we obtain that p = p is an equilibrium price
vector for E.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the literature on markets with indivisible objects. We in-
troduce the notion of p-substitutability to extend the scope of gross substitutability,
analyze economies with arbitrary types of preferences, and then prove a number of
existence results for an economy E under pE-substitutability. Our approach relies on
a classication result given in Section 4, Lemma 5, which partitions economies into
similarity classes and can be further applied to generalize each su¢ cient condition on
preferences, giving new existence results. For example, with a proof similar to that of
Theorem 1, it is not di¢ cult to obtain the following result. The proof is omitted for
brevity.
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Theorem 2 Let E =
 

; (vi)i2N

be an economy. If for each agent i 2 N , there exists
pi 2 Rj
j such that pi  pE and vi [pi] satises the GSC condition, then
(a) there exists a competitive equilibrium; and
(b) the social value vector p = (pa) 2 Rj
j dened by pa = vN (
)  vN (
n fag) is an
equilibrium price vector whenever the social valuation function viN has decreasing
marginal returns.
6 Appendix. Proof of Lemma 5
()) Assume that hX; pi is a competitive equilibrium for E 0 and let p0 = p _ q.
We rst prove that hX; p0i is also a competitive equilibrium for E 0. It is not di¢ cult
to prove that A^ = fa 2 
 : pa < qag is a subset ofX1. By denition there exists Y1  X1
such that v1 [q] (X1) = v1 (Y1) + q (X1nY1) and v1 [q] (Y1) = v1 (Y1). In case there exists
a^ 2 A^nX1, we have
v1 [q] (X1 [ fa^g)  p (X1 [ fa^g)  [v1 (Y1) + q ((X1 [ fa^g) nY1)]  p (X1 [ fa^g)
= v1 [q] (X1) + qa^   p (X1 [ fa^g) > v1 [q] (X1)  p (X1) ;
which contradicts to the fact X1 2 Dv1[q] (p). Note that A^  X1 implies p0a = pa for all
a 2 
nX1and hence Xi 2 Dvi (p0) for i = 2; : : : ; n. Moreover, since X1 2 Dv1[q] (p), it
follows that for each bundle A  
, we have
v1 [q] (X1)  p0 (X1) = v1 [q] (X1)  p (X1) + p

A^

  q

A^

 v1 [q]

A [ A^

  p

A [ A^

+ p

A^

  q

A^

= v1 [q]

A [ A^

  p0

A [ A^

 v1 [q] (A) + q

A^nA

  p0

A [ A^

= v1 [q] (A)  p0 (A) ;
i.e., X1 2 Dv1[q] (p0).
We are now ready to construct an equilibrium hY; p0i forE 00. LetY = (Y0; Y1; : : : ; Yn)
be the allocation given by Y0 = X1nY1 and Yi = Xi for i = 2; : : : ; n. Since p0  q and
X1 2 Dv1[q] (p0), it follows that
v1 [q] (Y1)  p0 (Y1) = v1 (Y1)  p0 (Y1) = v1 [q] (X1)  q (X1nY1)  p0 (Y1)
 v1 [q] (X1)  p0 (X1)  v1 [q] (Y1)  p0 (Y1) :
This implies Y1 2 Dv1[q] (p0) and Y0 2 Dv0 (p0).
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(() Assume that hX; pi is a competitive equilibrium for E 00 and let p0 = p _ q.
We are going to show that the pair hY; p0i such that Y1 = X0 [ X1 and Yi = Xi for
i = 2; : : : ; n is a competitive equilibrium for E
0
.
We note that A^ = fa 2 
 : pa < qag is a subset ofX0. In case there exists a^ 2 A^nX0,
then v0 (X0 [ fa^g)   p (X0 [ fa^g) = v0 (X0) + (qa^   pa^)   p (X0) > v0 (X0)   p (X0),
which contradicts to the fact X0 2 Dv0 (p). This implies
p0a = pa for all a 2 
nX0 (5)
and hence Yi = Xi 2 Dvi (p0) for i = 2; : : : ; n. On the other hand, in case there exists
b^ 2 X0 such that pb^ > qb^, we have v0

X0n
n
b^
o
  p

X0n
n
b^
o
= v0 (X0)+ (pb^   qb^) 
p (X0) > v0 (X0) p (X0), which contradicts to the factX0 2 Dv0 (p) again. This implies
that for all a 2 X0, pa  qa and hence p0a = qa. Let A  
 be an arbitrary bundle.
Then there exists A0  A such that v1 [q] (A) = v1 (A0) + q (AnA0). Together with (5)
and the facts X1 2 Dv1 (p) and p0 = p _ q, we have
v1 [q] (Y1)  p0 (Y1) = v1 [q] (X0 [X1)  p0 (X0 [X1)  v1 (X1) + q (X0)  p0 (X1)  p0 (X0)
= v1 (X1)  p (X1)  v1 (A0)  p (A0) = v1 [q] (A)  q (AnA0)  p (A0)
 v1 [q] (A)  p0 (A) .
This implies Y1 2 Dv1[q] (p0) and completes the proof.
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